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Compulsory Purchase and the State Redistribution of Land: A Study of Local Authority-
Private Developer Contractual Behaviour
Abstract
Purpose: The compulsory purchase of land forms the subject of much legal and urban 
regeneration research. However, there has been little examination of the contractual 
arrangements between local authorities and private sector property developers that often 
underpin the compulsory purchase process. This paper examines local authority/private 
developer contractual behaviour in this context. 
Design/methodology/approach: An empirical examination of property development contracts 
made for the “Silver Hill” project in Winchester, a small city in southern England, and the Brent 
Cross shopping centre extension in north London. Drawing on Macneil’s (1983) relational 
contract theory, the paper analyses key contract terms and reviews local authority documentation 
related to the implementation of those terms.
Findings: The contracts had two purposes: to provide a development and investment 
opportunity through the compulsory purchase and redistribution of private land; and to grant the 
private developers participating in the projects freedom to choose if they wished to take up that 
opportunity. While the contracts look highly “relational”, the scope for flexibility and reciprocity 
is both carefully planned and tightly controlled. This exposes an asymmetric power imbalance 
that emerges in and is rearticulated by this type of contractual arrangement.
Originality/value: Empirical analysis of contract terms and contractual behaviour provides a rare 
opportunity to scrutinise the local authority-private developer relationship underpinning both 
property development practice and compulsory purchase.
Article classification: Research paper.
Keywords: Compulsory purchase, property development, private profit, financial viability, 
private to private acquisitions, relational contract theory.

































































This paper investigates the state’s power to appropriate land in pursuit of private profit. David 
Harvey’s well-known concept of “accumulation by dispossession” examines the tendency within 
capitalist societies to generate surpluses of commodities, money and labour without 
accompanying opportunities for the utilisation of those surpluses (Harvey, 1999; 2003). State and 
corporate actors, Harvey posits, address this by creating financial growth and investment 
opportunities by forcibly redistributing assets from one property owning class to another (2003, 
p. 145). The assets redistributed in this way often include land: If an existing owner or occupier
refuses to part with land that a private developer has earmarked for property development, the 
latter has no means to secure that land unless the state intervenes. As Levien puts it, the 
redistribution of land from one private owner to another thus often rests upon “the desire of 
states to help capitalists overcome barriers to accumulation” (2015, p. 149). State bodies that 
seek to remove these barriers do so, Levien argues, by acting as a type of “land broker” tasked 
with transferring land to the private owner deemed to be best placed to put it to “profitable” use 
(2011, p. 463. See also Gray, 2007, p. 79). In the UK, these trends have provoked controversies 
when local authorities use compulsory purchase to assemble a development site so that private 
corporations can develop, invest in and profit from that land. 
Case law and academic commentary on “private to private” land acquisitions highlights 
the tensions that can arise when English local authorities use compulsory purchase in ways that 
appear primarily to favour large corporate interests and that produce an imbalance between 
public benefits and private profits (Gray, 2011; Waring, 2013; Maxwell, 2017). Other academic 
work on compulsory purchase of land for private profit asks how those who stand to be 
dispossessed might counter this trend (Hubbard and Lees, 2018). Some accounts examine the 
various legal mechanisms at play (Layard, 2010; Hodkinson and Essen, 2015), although there has 
been less analysis of the contractual arrangements that local authorities make with private 
companies to facilitate land redistributions. This is surprising, particularly since, in R (Archway 
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Sheet Metal Works) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and others [2015] EWHC 
794 (Admin), [2015] 2 WLUK 699, Dove J quoted with approval a Planning Inspector’s report 
stating that it would be unusual for a local authority and a developer not to agree detailed 
contracts for the use of compulsory purchase to facilitate private to private acquisitions 
(paragraph 17). By providing an in-depth examination of contractual behaviour in this context, 
the paper shows how contract planning and implementation create opportunities for the 
reallocation of landownership and the accumulation of private capital rather than concrete public 
benefits. 
To help understand the purpose behind as well as the effect of this behaviour, this paper 
examines two property development contracts. The first is a contract for the redevelopment of 
the “Silver Hill” area in Winchester, a small city in southern England. The second is a contract 
for the construction of an extension to Brent Cross shopping centre and the wider regeneration 
of surrounding parts of north London. The first development is referred to here as “the SH 
development” and the local authority, the developer and the contract are, respectively, “SHLA”, 
“SHD” and “the SH Contract”. Similar shorthand is used for the second development, which is 
the “BX development” and the local authority, the developer and the contract are “BXLA”, 
“BXD” and “the BX Contract”. These contracts provide an important illustration of the 
lopsided interface between public and private power because they were designed to facilitate 
large projects that the developers agreed to fund and build but for which the local authorities 
agreed to provide the land earmarked for the developments.
The primary focus in this paper is the insights that the SH and BX Contracts provide 
into the local authority-private property developer dynamic while the parties seek to redistribute 
private land. Attention is paid to the express terms of the Contracts and what the parties do in, 
and with, their contractual arrangements. Ian Macneil’s relational contract theory, which 
encourages analysis of contracting parties’ interrelations within the context of “common contract 
behavioral patterns and norms” (2000, p. 879), provides a “set of tools” for examining the 
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choices parties make when planning and seeking to effectuate an exchange (Mitchell, 2013, p. 
177). By drawing on Macneil’s work, the paper argues that SHLA and BXLA were useful cogs in 
wider processes of accumulation by dispossession. The paper then argues that the SH and BX 
Contracts created an unbalanced power dynamic. On the one hand, the paper explains that the 
Contracts allowed SHD and BXD to choose whether or not to commence construction. On the 
other hand, the paper shows that SHLA and BXLA had to pursue the compulsory purchase of 
private land while waiting for the developers to decide if they wished to do anything with that 
land. The implications of this were that SHLA and BXLA had secured control of the land on 
behalf of their respective development partners while the developers remained uncommitted to 
the development schemes.
The paper’s first section introduces the case studies. The second section situates this type 
of property development activity within Harvey’s concept of accumulation by dispossession and 
draws together legal and academic discussions of private to private acquisitions. The section then 
summarises Macneil’s “common contract norms” and examines the work of academics who 
both utilise and criticise Macneil’s ideas. The third section begins the analysis of the case studies 
and explains what it means to say that the principal commitments in the SH and BX Contracts 
were contingent on the satisfaction or waiver of various “conditions precedent”. By considering 
this in the context of both relationality and accumulation by dispossession, this section contrasts 
the looseness of the developers’ conditional duty to fund land acquisitions and to commence 
construction with the tightness of the developers’ control over the transition from 
“conditionality” to “unconditionality”. The fourth section builds on this by examining the role 
the Contracts played in facilitating compulsory purchase despite the inherent flexibility of the 
conditional contractual commitments. This section also analyses why these conditional 
arrangements drew the local authorities into legally and financially risky actions designed to move 
the developments towards unconditionality. The conclusions then reflect on how carefully 
planned contractual arrangements allow private developers to escape a project if they perceive 
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the financial risks are too great. This ability to walk away, however, enables private developers to 
extract concessions from their local authority partners and deepens the lopsided power dynamic 
described above.
Compulsory Purchase, Private Profit and Property Development Contracts
A local authority intending to use compulsory purchase can make a Compulsory Purchase Order 
(CPO) if it believes that “development, redevelopment or improvement” of the affected land is 
“likely to contribute” social, economic or environmental benefits to the area (Town and Country 
Planning Act 1990, section 226(1)(a) and (1A)). Section 226(4) of the 1990 Act states that a local 
authority that has “made” a CPO does not have to develop, redevelop or improve the affected 
land itself, although a local authority cannot begin acquiring that land until the Secretary of State 
for Housing, Communities and Local Government (the SSHCLG) has “confirmed” the CPO 
(Acquisition of Land Act 1981 (ALA 1981), section 2). If any affected landowners or occupiers 
object, the SSHCLG will appoint a Planning Inspector to chair a Public Inquiry (ALA 1981, 
section 13A). After the Inquiry, the Inspector will report to the SSHCLG who can either 
confirm, modify and confirm or refuse to confirm the CPO (ALA 1981, section 13A(5)). 
Following confirmation, the local authority can “exercise” the CPO and any dispossessed owners 
or occupiers will receive compensation. 
In November 2011, SHLA made a CPO for the SH development to enable the 
acquisition of a doctors’ surgery, a health centre, shops, offices and warehouses in central 
Winchester (Thorby, 2012, paragraph 2.3). Three affected landowners objected (Thorby, 2012, 
paragraphs 5.2-5.70) but, following a Public Inquiry, the Secretary of State confirmed the CPO 
on 20 March 2013. When local authorities seek confirmation for a CPO designed to facilitate 
property development by a private company, they often publish redacted copies of their 
contracts to demonstrate their partner’s commitment both to fund the compensation of 
dispossessed owners and occupiers and to construct the project within an agreed timescale 
(Winter and Lloyd, 2006, p. 791) [1]. SHLA/SHD signed the SH Contract on 22 December 2004 





























































Journal of Property, Planning and Environm
ental Law
6
and, in it, agreed that SHLA would compulsorily purchase the land required for the development 
(clause 10). In return, SHD agreed to construct a development incorporating 90,000 square feet 
of retail floor-space, 364 homes (of which 35% were to be “affordable housing”) and a new bus 
station (SH Contract, clause 5.3). The version of the SH Contract submitted to the CPO Inquiry 
contains redactions focussed on financial details, such as the minimum annual rent that SHD 
would pay to SHLA for a 200-year lease of the assembled development site (SH Contract, clause 
11.2.3 and appendix 5). These redactions suggest limitations to the Contract’s usefulness as 
research material, although SHLA did not redact the conditions precedent that suspended SHD’s 
duty to commence construction. Consequently, the published version of the SH Contract 
provides rich insight into the arrangements that existed between SHLA and SHD to facilitate 
compulsory purchase and redistribution of the affected land. The SH Contract also provides rich 
data because SHLA agreed contract variations following confirmation of the CPO. These 
variations were highly controversial and formed the subject of High Court legal action in R 
(Gottlieb) v Winchester City Council [2015] EWHC 231 (Admin), [2015] 2 WLUK 359, which 
ultimately led to the termination of the project. This paper’s fourth section discusses this legal 
action, which highlights the legally and financially risky actions that a local authority might take 
to demonstrate contractual solidarity with a private sector development partner.
The second contract analysed here was made on 3 March 2015 between BXLA and 
BXD. BXD is a joint venture consisting of companies owned by Hammerson plc and Standard 
Life plc (Mike McGuinness, Evidence submitted to BX CPO Inquiry (MM evidence), paragraph 
2). The former is a multi-national property developer and the latter is a multi-national investment 
company. As of March 2015, Hammerson and Standard Life jointly owned Brent Cross 
shopping centre on a series of leases from BXLA due to expire in March 2162 (MM evidence, 
paragraph 2.2). The BX Contract, which BXLA published in redacted form prior to the BX CPO 
Inquiry, was for the compulsory purchase and redistribution of land adjacent to the shopping 
centre and the construction of a shopping centre extension, a new bus station, 280 new homes 
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and the transport infrastructure necessary for wider regeneration in the area (Cath Shaw, 
Evidence submitted to BX CPO Inquiry (CS evidence), paragraphs 6.2-6.7). On the same day 
that BXLA/BXD agreed the BX Contract, they also agreed a supplementary contract in which 
BXD promised to indemnify BXLA for costs it would incur in using compulsory purchase (the 
BX Indemnity Contract). 
At the same time as agreeing the BX Contract, BXLA contracted with another private 
property developer for the wider regeneration of Brent Cross (CS evidence, paragraph 2.3). 
BXLA also sought the construction of a new railway station in Brent Cross to service both 
developments (CS evidence, paragraph 3.41). In April 2015, BXLA made a CPO to acquire the 
land for both the shopping centre and wider regeneration projects. That land included the site of 
the existing Brent Cross bus station, various commercial premises and industrial buildings as well 
as homes, sheltered accommodation and a day care centre (Clegg, 2017, paragraph 2). 68 owners 
and occupiers of the land required for the shopping centre extension presented objections 
(Clegg, 2017, summary). These included the owners and occupiers of private homes and local 
businesses. Despite these objections, the SSHCLG confirmed the CPO on 7 December 2017 
(LBB, 2018, paragraph 1.43). The contract for the shopping centre extension is studied here 
because BXLA envisaged that this project would facilitate construction of the wider regeneration 
project and the railway station (CS evidence, paragraph 5.9). The BX Contract is also topical 
because, in July 2018, Hammerson announced that BXD intended to delay construction of the 
shopping centre extension but not to abandon the project (Hammerson plc, 2018). 
While the SH and BX Contracts relate to different types of project, there are significant 
similarities in their contents. In particular, both Contracts articulated the contracting parties’ 
shared desire to achieve confirmation for the CPOs that would enable assembly of the 
development sites. Consequently, the Contracts provide a rare opportunity to scrutinise the local 
authority-private developer relationship that often underpins compulsory purchase. To 
investigate what the parties did in and with the Contracts, this paper considers documents 
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produced at the respective local authorities’ meetings and documents produced at both CPO 
Inquiries [2]. While the SH and BX Contracts may not be typical of all such contracts, the 
findings provide multiple insights into the interlocking processes underpinning the production 
and use of property development contracts for private to private acquisitions.
Capital Accumulation, Compulsory Purchase and Relationality
To facilitate ongoing accumulation, Harvey explains, capital must be capable of circulation and 
reorganisation in pursuit of surplus value, or profit. This, however, produces contradictions. On 
the one hand, for example, many capital accumulation strategies presuppose “a solid legal 
foundation” for the preservation of private property rights (Harvey, 1999, p. 18). On the other 
hand, the constant pursuit of private profit produces a tendency towards centralisation as 
“[l]arger-scale capitalists […] gobble up the smaller”, often through institutional arrangements 
facilitated and managed by the state (Harvey, 1999, p. 139). This manifests, in some instances, in 
the state’s willingness to use compulsory purchase to reallocate otherwise fixed landholdings 
from relatively unproductive individual owners to more economically powerful private 
companies capable of producing investment opportunities and putting land to its purportedly 
most productive use (Fox-Rogers et al, 2011, p. 661). 
The activities examined here involve local authorities seeking to acquire privately-held 
land from unwilling sellers to facilitate projects intended, at least partially, to benefit large-scale 
private companies. The Supreme Court considered this type of activity in R (Sainsbury’s 
Supermarkets Ltd) v Wolverhampton City Council [2010] UKSC 20, [2011] 1 AC 437. Two 
supermarkets, Tesco and Sainsbury’s, had identified a site in Wolverhampton, in central England, 
as suitable for retail and residential development but, while both had acquired landholdings in 
the site, neither would countenance selling their interests to the other (per Lord Collins, 
paragraphs 17-18). To resolve this, both retailers suggested that Wolverhampton City Council 
(Wolverhampton) use compulsory purchase to consolidate the landholdings. Tesco owned a 
much smaller proportion of the site (around 14%, compared to around 86% in the ownership or 
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control of Sainsbury’s (per Lord Mance, paragraph 100)) but offered to use projected profits 
from the development to “cross-subsidise” separate development elsewhere in the city. 
Wolverhampton consequently chose Tesco as its development partner and agreed to make a 
CPO to acquire Sainsbury’s interests and transfer the assembled site to Tesco. However, on a 4:3 
majority, the Supreme Court quashed Wolverhampton’s resolution to use compulsory purchase 
because the council had unlawfully based its decision on the opportunity for redevelopment of 
the second site in the city. 
For this paper’s purposes, Sainsbury’s is important for what it says about compulsory 
purchase for property development when a consequence is “private” gain. If the CPO examined 
in Sainsbury’s had been confirmed, Tesco would have profited from the operation of a 
supermarket but would have also acquired a valuable land interest from an unwilling seller. Lord 
Walker characterised this as a “private to private” acquisition:
The land is to end up, not in public ownership and used for public purposes, but in 
private ownership and used for a variety of purposes, mainly retail and residential. 
Economic regeneration brought about by urban redevelopment is no doubt a public 
good, but “private to private” acquisitions by compulsory purchase may also 
produce large profits for powerful business interests, and courts rightly regard them 
as particularly sensitive (paragraph 81).
By discussing “ownership” and “purposes” in these terms, Lord Walker distinguishes 
compulsory purchase that results in private ownership of land that then generates substantial 
profits for already powerful private companies and compulsory purchase that results in public 
ownership of land that is then used for “public” goods. On each side of this superficially neat 
dichotomy, the acceptability or otherwise of the activity seems clear. As Gray has put it, for 
example, there appears to be a “deep immorality” inherent to any “forced confiscation of a 
cherished domestic residence” for “the predominating purpose of corporate profit” (2007, p. 
83). However, the distinction between an acceptable and an unacceptable CPO becomes blurry 
when the project offers some form of general “public benefit” but is led by a private compa y 
that thus gains a specific opportunity for substantial private profit (Waring, 2013, p. 240). 
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Alliance Spring Co Ltd v First Secretary of State [2005] EWHC 18 (Admin), [2005] 1 WLUK 
228 exemplifies the problematic linkage between compulsory purchase and private profit. The 
case involved Arsenal Football Club, a member of the English Premier League, based in 
Islington, in north London. Islington Council made a CPO to facilitate the construction by the 
club of a stadium that would be larger than their pre-existing facility, as well as homes, 
commercial premises and community buildings (paragraph 5). The CPO would enable the 
acquisition of land owned by various small businesses, some of which objected. The Planning 
Inspector adjudicating at the consequent Public Inquiry recommended that the Secretary of State 
should refuse to confirm the CPO because, according to the Inspector, the primary purpose was 
not to bring social, economic or environmental benefits to the area but was to satisfy both 
Arsenal’s expansionary ambitions and the council’s desire to ensure that the club did not relocate 
elsewhere in London (quoted at paragraphs 10-13). The Secretary of State chose, nevertheless, to 
confirm the CPO because he upheld the council’s contention that the CPO’s primary purpose 
and intended effect was to regenerate under-utilised land (quoted at paragraph 17). In the High 
Court, Collins J said that the Inspector and the Secretary of State had both been right to consider 
the CPO’s purpose and its likely effect but that he agreed with the Secretary of State’s 
conclusions (paragraph 23). 
The practices examined in Alliance Spring have, however, proven controversial. Fox-
Rogers et al, for example, note that state involvement in capital accumulation activities focused 
on the built environment has facilitated the “mass production of downtown shopping districts, 
riverside regeneration schemes and sports stadia”, even when the purported public benefits are 
contested (2011, p. 648). In relation to the CPO discussed in Alliance Spring, Gray has 
commented that the full range of specific community gains that Arsenal offered never 
materialised (2011, pp. 26-27). Nevertheless, Collins J’s decision in Alliance Spring was 
unsurprising because administrative and judicial decision-makers tend to uphold the use of 
compulsory purchase to facilitate economic development projects as long as developers 
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promoting those projects promise some form of general public benefit (Waring, 2013, p. 247). 
Despite this, distinguishing between a legitimate and an illegitimate compulsory purchase for 
private to private acquisitions has remained “far from straightforward” (Maxwell, 2017, p. 1350) 
both because the notion of a sufficiently “acceptable” public benefit is “ill-defined” (Waring, 
2013, p. 240) and because identifying if the primary beneficiary is a private company or the 
community at large is a difficult task. Rather than adding to the literature that seeks to define 
nebulous concepts such as public benefit, this paper argues that a means to scrutinise the 
acceptability of compulsory purchase for private to private acquisitions lies in a detailed 
examination of the contractual relations that often underpin these acquisitions. 
Macneil’s relational contract theory provides a framework for this analysis. For Macneil, 
some contractual arrangements are relatively “discrete” whereas others are more “relational” 
(2000, p. 895). A fully discrete arrangement would be “100 percent planned” and would require 
effectuation of the parties’ consent to complete implementation of that plan (1980, p. 60). This 
type of transaction would also be fully “presentiated” in that the parties agree to fix their future 
dealings in accordance with their present intentions. Macneil argues, however, that no fully 
discrete or presentiated transactions can exist because more “relational” behaviours always pull 
against the strict implementation of a pre-agreed plan (1983, pp. 350-351). The more relational 
norms that Macneil identifies are role integrity, contractual solidarity, flexibility, trust and 
harmonization with the social matrix (1983, pp. 361-366). Macneil’s categories of contractual 
behaviour are not presented as a “sophisticated” or “exhaustive” theory (2000, p. 880) but they 
do provide a means to analyse the give and take of complex and enduring relations produced 
“among people in the course of projecting exchange into the future” (1983, p. 341. Footnotes 
omitted. See also Blandy et al, 2018). The point, as Mitchell puts it, is “that ongoing contractual 
relations may be expected to display the norms in various combinations and to different degrees 
of strength” (2013, p. 178. Footnote omitted).
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Academic commentary on Macneil’s work has acknowledged the merit in the argument 
that all contracts are relational (Scott, 2000, p. 852), although Macneil’s critics have pointed out 
that “relationality” is hard both to define and to operationalise in law (Eisenberg, 2000, p. 814; 
Kimel, 2007, p. 239). These critics posit that contract law should not be reimagined to enable 
courts either to treat more relational contract terms as legally enforceable or to assist contracting 
parties who agree more relational contracts yet find themselves in disputes. The extent to which 
courts should regulate contract terms based on relational behavioural norms nevertheless 
remains a live debate (Mitchell, 2013, pp. 180-197), although the purpose here is not to add to 
that discussion. Rather, this paper shows what the configuration of Macneil’s common contract 
norms in property development contracts says about the parties’ bargaining positions and the 
effects of the terms that they write into their agreements. Using Macneil’s categories of 
contractual behaviour in this way is not an entirely novel exercise because others have also 
studied the common contract norms to better understand specific types of long-term, complex 
contractual relations. The way that Vincent-Jones (2006) draws out “imbalances” between more 
relational behaviour and the intensification of discrete norms in contractual arrangements 
involving public bodies is particularly instructive. For Vi cent-Jones, the common contract 
norms provide a methodology for evaluating how long-term contractual relations are performing 
(2006, p. 30). Applied in the context of compulsory purchase for private to private acquisitions, 
this mode of contract analysis helps to show why some configurations of the contact norms 
impose high levels of prescription on local authorities while operating flexibly for the private 
property developers engaged in these projects. 
Conditionality: Planning for Compulsory Purchase and Land Redistribution
The compulsory purchase and redistribution of land earmarked for the case study developments 
required long-term and complex contractual arrangements. The mechanisms in the Contracts for 
the delivery of development on the affected land consisted of a series of “conditions precedent”, 
an “Unconditional Date” and a “Long-Stop Date”. Both Contracts stated that the Unconditional 
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Date would be the date of “satisfaction” or “waiver” of the last condition precedent (SH 
Contract, clause 1.1.73; BX Contract, clause 1) but both also stated that the Long-Stop Date 
would allow either party to terminate the relationship if “unconditionality” had not occurred. 
[Insert Table 1]
Table 1 states the planned effect of the respective Unconditional Dates, the contents of 
the conditions precedent and the agreed Long-Stop Dates. BXLA/BXD agreed that, before 
unconditionality could occur, BXD needed full planning permission for the development (the 
Planning Condition), road closure and traffic management orders (the Highways Condition) and 
agreements with utilities companies for the installation of various services (the Infrastructure 
Condition). Unconditionality also depended upon BXD obtaining agreements for lease for an 
agreed proportion of the proposed retail area (the Pre-let Condition), third-party investment to 
fund construction costs (the Funding Condition) and an agreement with a building company for 
construction of the development (the Tender Condition). In addition, unconditionality required a 
confirmed CPO (the CPO Condition) and, if the CPO did not enable the acquisition of all the 
required land, sale agreements between BXD and the owners of any outstanding landholdings 
(the Land Assembly Condition). Finally, the commitments in the BX Contract were conditional 
on BXD producing an appraisal showing that the proposals were financially viable in terms that 
BXD deemed acceptable (the Viability Condition). The SH Contract contained similar 
conditions, although unconditionality also depended upon SHD confirming that on-site ground 
quality would not diminish profitability (the Site Survey Condition) and settling an agreement to 
sell the affordable housing component of the development to a registered social housing 
provider (the Affordable Housing Condition). 
The BX and SH Contracts also stated the agreed consequences of unconditionality. In 
the BX Contract, for example, BXLA/BXD agreed that, if each condition precedent had been 
satisfied, BXLA would compulsorily purchase and then transfer the land to BXD in exchange 
for an annual ground rent (BX Contract, clauses 5.2.3(a) and 15.1. See also LBB, 2014, 
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paragraphs 9.12-9.14). BXD would fund the compulsory purchase (BX Indemnity Contract, 
clause 10.3) and, following land exchange, commence construction (BX Contract, clause 6.2.1). 
After construction concluded, the parties would share profits accruing from the development 
(BX Contract, schedule 4) [3]. In addition, however, BXLA/BXD had agreed a “time-in-
between” the contract date and the deadline for unconditionality that was initially open-ended 
because the parties tied it to confirmation of the CPO. SHLA/SHD, by comparison, fixed the 
deadline for unconditionality. This nevertheless made the commitments in both Contracts highly 
flexible: the time-in-between allowed the developers to obtain planning permission, negotiate 
agreements for lease with prospective tenants, and to seek variations to the planning permission 
before they had to fund land acquisitions or commence construction.
Flexibility is, as Macneil has observed, essential to long-term contractual relations (1983, 
p. 363). The conditions precedent discussed above provided a means to manage emergent risks
and uncertainties. Waiver clauses in both Contracts then provided additional flexibility by 
allowing the developers to choose if they wished to proceed with the development opportunities. 
Table 1 states the conditions in the Contracts that could be waived. Importantly, neither 
Contract granted either local authority a right to waive a condition precedent. BXLA agreed, 
instead, that BXD could waive the Funding, Pre-let, Tender and Viability Conditions. The 
“unwaivable” Land Assembly Condition in the BX Contract stated that BXLA could not insist 
that BXD commenced construction unless either a confirmed CPO or agreements for sale 
enabled full assembly of a development site. Presumably, however, BXD would have neither 
sought nor ever intended to exercise a right to waive that Condition because the BX Contract 
was not designed to expedite building work but to redistribute land and provide capital 
accumulation opportunities. The three other “unwaivable” conditions related to external 
regulatory requirements that BXD would, presumably, also have never countenanced waiving. 
Unlike BXLA/BXD, SHLA/SHD agreed an unwaivable Funding Condition. No public 
records explain this differential treatment, although the companies acting jointly as BXD were 
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FTSE-100 corporations who may have been confident in their capacity to self-finance the 
development and for whom a waivable condition would provide an option to start construction 
either with or without a third-party funding agreement. SHD, on the other hand, was originally a 
subsidiary of a smaller company that relied primarily for its funding on debt finance from a 
single bank (Steve Tilbury Evidence submitted to SH CPO Inquiry (ST evidence), paragraph 
3.4). SHLA may, therefore, have wanted an unwaivable condition to ensure that it would not be 
required to exercise a confirmed CPO unless SHD had a signed funding agreement in place.
The respective contracting parties also agreed different Viability Conditions. These 
Conditions meant that the developers would not have to start building or fund the CPOs unless 
viability appraisals projected a target financial return. BXD could waive the Viability Condition 
whereas SHD could not, although the practical implications of this difference seem limited 
because the Conditions still gave both developers significant control. Tying unconditionality to 
prospective profitability also exposes a current tension in property development practice. Recent 
academic criticism points to the inadequacy of local authority scrutiny of the modelling of 
projected development profits and the role those models perform in enabling developers to 
minimise their obligation to provide public gains while maximising their private profit 
(Christophers, 2014). This is problematic in relation to compulsory purchase because SHD and 
BXD both provided evidence at the CPO Inquiries indicating that satisfaction of the Viability 
Conditions was imminent (Martin Perry, Evidence submitted to SH CPO Inquiry (MP evidence), 
paragraph 14.8; MM evidence, paragraph 5.20). Following both Inquiries, however, the 
developers then reported that the projects were no longer sufficiently profitable for construction 
to commence on the pre-agreed terms (Gottlieb, paragraph 70; Hammerson plc, 2018, p.10). 
What this shows is that both Contracts were designed to remain highly conditional and to shelter 
both developers from the market risks inherent to the pursuit of private profit.
Waivable Pre-let Conditions in the Contracts provided similarly one-sided flexibility. The 
Pre-let Condition in the SH Contract could be satisfied through agreements for lease amounting 
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to “not less than 70% of total yearly rents of ground and first floor retail units” (MP evidence, 
Appendices, p. 24). This Condition consequently gave SHD further control: If the confirmed 
CPO provided the land required and SHD was both confident that it would achieve its profit 
target and was ready to start construction then there would be no need to insist on satisfaction of 
the Condition. Alternatively, and as an affected landowner at the CPO Inquiry pointed out, if 
SHD wanted to suspend the moment at which unconditionality occurred, it could insist on its 
need to satisfy the Pre-let Condition even though SHLA had secured a confirmed CPO 
(summarised in Thorby, 2012, paragraph 5.42).
These conditions precedent and the accompanying waiver clauses illustrate the 
asymmetric power dynamics that arise when a local authority seeks to “broker” private to private 
acquisitions. When they signed the Contracts, the developers gained time in which to address the 
emergence of predictable and unknown risks and ensured that their local authority partners 
could not instruct them to start building before the developers had obtained planning 
permission, road closure orders, agreements for lease, a suitable viability appraisal and so on. 
Moreover, each developer could impose the decision to waive or seek satisfaction of a condition 
precedent on the local authority, exposing the hierarchical relations between the parties and 
suggesting an imbalance in the configuration of the common contract norms in the developers’ 
favour. On the other hand, SHLA and BXLA were each subject to high levels of prescription 
and both agreed binding obligations requiring them to make and seek confirmation for the 
CPOs that would redistribute the land. Compulsory purchase is, as Layard observes (2010, p. 
422), complex for local authorities to navigate but, by fixing their future dealings in this way, 
SHLA and BXLA each promised to remove one of the key uncertainties inherent to property 
development. In doing so, they gave each developer both a development opportunity and a 
scheme through which the developers could decide to take or leave that opportunity.
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Preserving the Relation: Dates, the Public Interest and Power Imbalances
Contractual behaviour during the case study developments highlights the nature of one-sided 
flexibility in private to private acquisitions. But the developments are also notable for how the 
conditional contractual arrangements travelled to the respective CPO Inquiries to instil a 
persuasive sense of progress despite the inherent flexibility of the conditions precedent and the 
waiver clauses discussed above. The underlying issues show how local authorities, as Harvey 
might put it, “lay themselves open to whatever the superior powers of monopolized capital wish 
or need to do” (2003, p. 130). This section thus examines the legally and financially risky actions 
that local authorities might find themselves compelled to take when they subordinate themselves 
to private capital accumulation strategies.
The Inspectors adjudicating at the SH and BX CPO Inquiries considered the making of 
both the CPOs and the statutory orders that would satisfy the Land Assembly, Road Closure and 
Highways Conditions in the respective Contracts (Thorby, 2012, paragraph 1.4; Clegg, 2017, 
paragraph 1.2). In 2015, the SSHCLG issued guidance to local authorities seeking confirmation 
for a CPO [4]. That guidance states that, to obtain confirmation, a local authority should 
demonstrate a sufficiently “compelling case in the public interest” (MHCLG, 2019, paragraph 2; 
ODPM, 2004, part 1, paragraph 17), which, as the case law discussed earlier suggests, requires 
the prospective fulfilment of some form of “public purpose”. SHLA and BXLA each highlighted 
this public interest aspect by pointing to the likely creation of local jobs, the leveraging of further 
private sector development and investment, and the provision of on-site housing, transport 
infrastructure and civic spaces (CS evidence, paragraphs 7.12-7.14; ST evidence, paragraphs 6.3-
6.5). 
A local authority seeking confirmation for a CPO must, however, do more than simply 
show that the CPO will enable certain public goods. While a local authority need not ensure that 
construction will begin on affected land “immediately”, it should demonstrate that it has a “clear 
idea” how the land will be used (MHCLG, 2019, paragraph 13; ODPM, 2004, part 1, paragraphs 
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18-19). The CPO rules also state that a “general indication of funding intentions, and of any
commitment from third parties, will usually suffice to reassure the Secretary of State that there is 
a reasonable prospect that the scheme will proceed” (MHCLG, 2019, paragraph 106. See also 
ODPM, 2004, Appendix A, paragraph 16(iii)). The necessary level of third-party commitment 
was an issue in Archway Sheet Metal Works [2015] EWHC 794 (Admin), [2015] 2 WLUK 699, 
another north London stadium-led regeneration case. The applicant in that case argued that the 
CPO to be used to reallocate their land was unlawful because the developer, Tottenham Hotspur 
Football Club, had not made contractual arrangements with the council in terms similar to those 
discussed in this paper (paragraph 15). The applicant further complained that the Secretary of 
State had not addressed this alleged shortcoming when he confirmed the making of the CPO 
(paragraph 71). Dove J found, however, no error of law and concluded that the Secretary of 
State had communicated various justifications for his belief that there was a reasonable prospect 
that Tottenham would construct the buildings planned for the site (paragraph 77). The Secretary 
of State was also justified, according to Dove J, in concluding that the absence of a contract 
committing the club to commence construction was unproblematic in the context of positive 
financial viability appraisals and a public statement from Tottenham’s chairman expressing 
commitment to the project (quoted at paragraph 10).
Archway Sheet Metal Works indicates, therefore, that the extent to which contractual 
arrangements will be necessary to solidify a belief that there is a reasonable prospect that a 
scheme will proceed depends on the circumstances. SHD and BXD did use their Contracts in 
this way to present an alluring internal cohesiveness to the planned transition from loosely-
defined conditional commitments to the settled state that would follow the Unconditional Date. 
In doing so, they presented unconditionality as the inevitable culmination of a smooth and 
predictable process: “My experience is that a successful CPO process provides the certainty 
upon which the other [conditions precedent] can be progressed to satisfaction” (MM evidence, 
paragraph 5.14. See also MP evidence, Appendices, p. 28). Both Inspectors then concluded that, 
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since the Contracts stipulated the provision of various environmental, social and economic 
goods (Thorby, 2012, paragraphs 7.8-7.18; Clegg, 2017, paragraphs 12.10-12.37) and because 
unconditionality was likely to occur (Thorby, 2012, paragraphs 7.23-7.24; Clegg, 2017, paragraph 
12.41), there was a compelling case in the public interest justifying compulsory purchase. 
On the recommendations of the respective Inspectors, the Secretary of State confirmed 
each CPO. SHD and BXD had thus obtained both the right to the land required for the 
developments and the regulatory documents necessary for construction. Allen has argued that 
CPO rules give public bodies significant power to control negotiations over compulsory 
purchase for private to private acquisitions (2008, p. 89) but this paper suggests that the 
combined effect of the CPO rules and the conditional nature of some property development 
contracts incentivises only such commitment, on the part of private developers, as is necessary to 
get confirmation for a CPO. The case study developments illustrate this because unconditionality 
in the SH and BX Contracts did not follow automatically from confirmation of either CPO. 
While both Inspectors had been persuaded that unconditionality would follow in a sufficiently 
timely manner, the respective developers had made it clear that the other conditions precedent 
had been neither satisfied nor waived so SHLA and BXLA had to wait to be told when to 
exercise the CPOs and if building would start. 
This outcome does not mean, however, that the SH and BX Contracts rendered SHLA 
and BXLA entirely passive. Instead, both local authorities took legal and financial risks to 
preserve their contractual relations and to maintain the sense of movement towards 
unconditionality. After obtaining confirmation for the SH CPO, SHLA agreed to vary the SH 
Contract to remove the requirement that SHD should provide affordable housing and a new bus 
station. This led to the High Court action in Gottlieb [2015] EWHC 231 (Admin), [2015] 2 
WLUK 359, in which Lang J concluded that these variations changed the SH Contract so 
“materially” as to amount to the formation of a new public works concession contract 
(paragraph 70). This meant, for public procurement law purposes, that SHLA should have 
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conducted a tendering exercise during which other developers could bid to enter into contractual 
relations with SHLA (paragraphs 141-142). SHLA had agreed the variations “because the 
Council accepted the Developer’s representations that the project was not viable on the original 
contractual terms” but had not initiated a tendering process despite the evident risk of legal 
action for breach of public procurement law (paragraph 70). The 2014 variations were, 
consequently, void, although subsequent case law has suggested that Gottlieb may have been 
wrongly decided. In R (Wylde) v Waverley Borough Council [2017] EWHC 466 (Admin), [2017] 
PTSR 1245, Dove J indicated that Lang J should have refused the claimant in Gottlieb permission 
to challenge SHLA’s decision to vary the Contract (Wylde, paragraph 42). This point has not been 
tested further, however, and the fact remains that SHLA risked a legal challenge when its Cabinet 
approved those variations.
As well as varying the public goods provision in the SH Contract, SHLA also twice 
extended the contractual deadline for unconditionality. SHLA/SHD had agreed that, if 
unconditionality had not occurred by 31 December 2009 (the Final Long-Stop Date), either party 
could terminate the Contract. To give SHD more time to secure funding, however, SHLA agreed 
a new Final Long-Stop Date of 31 August 2014 (WCC, 2010, paragraph 3.4) before extending 
the Final Long-Stop Date again to June 2015 (Gottlieb, paragraph 109) to allow SHD to redesign 
the development and complete the land acquisitions following CPO confirmation (WCC, 2013, 
paragraph 3). The latter extension produced the variations considered in Gottlieb. Following the 
High Court’s decision, the Final Long-Stop Date was thus June 2015. By January 2016, SHD had 
not satisfied or waived the conditions precedent but neither party had exercised their right to 
terminate. Instead, SHLA awaited the “CPO Exercise Date”. A local authority must exercise a 
confirmed CPO within three years of confirmation (section 4, Compulsory Purchase Act 1965; 
section 5A, Compulsory Purchase (Vesting Declarations) Act 1981). There is no scope for 
extension so an “unexercised” CPO lapses on that date. The SH CPO Exercise Date passed in 
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March 2016 without unconditionality or CPO exercise occurring, so SHLA then terminated the 
SH Contract (WCC, 2016, Item 5 Resolution 1).
The deadline for the SH Contract to become unconditional had, consequently, only 
become strict when linked directly to land assembly. Making termination rights automatic and 
tying them, from the outset, to a CPO Exercise Date might thus change the nature of a 
contractual relationship founded on satisfaction or waiver of conditions precedent. As Table 1 
shows, BXLA/BXD did this when they agreed the BX Contract. However, for BXLA, the 
Contract had, paraphrasing Vincent-Jones (2006, p. 158), a significant “quality of bindingness” 
even when it remained highly conditional. This is because the development was part of a wider 
regeneration project involving a new railway station. BXLA/BXD had been negotiating the 
terms on which compulsory purchase and land redistribution would take place since 2003 (CS 
evidence, paragraph 5.12) and they had initially envisaged that BXD would fund the railway 
station from profits accruing from the Brent Cross shopping centre extension (CS evidence, 
paragraph 5.14). In 2015, however, BXLA agreed to fund the railway station costs with a grant 
from the UK government and by borrowing money against anticipated tax receipts from the 
shopping centre extension (CS evidence, paragraph 5.17). To record this, BXLA/BXD amended 
the BX Contract (Note on Brent Cross Shopping Centre Property Development Agreement and 
Associated Revisions (submitted to BX CPO Inquiry)) and this commitment to borrow against 
future tax receipts appears, consequently, to have functioned as an incentive to encourage BXD 
to proceed with the development. Borrowing against future tax receipts is, however, a precarious 
strategy for preserving a contractual relation and presents a “peculiarly exposed cutting edge” if, 
as Harvey points out, there is no guarantee that private capital will follow where public funds 
have led (1999, p. 409). Moreover, the SSHCLG confirmed the BX CPO on 7 December 2017, 
which means the Long-Stop Date in the BX Contract is 7 December 2020. While this date 
provides a metaphorical line in the sand, at the time of writing, the project has stalled. This 
provides a stark illustration of what “relationality” can mean in the context of property 
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development contracts for private to private acquisitions. The BX Contract obliged BXLA to be 
sensitive to the circumstances in which BXD would both acquire the land and commit to 
commence construction but, in return, BXD allowed BXLA to bear the risks of significant 
infrastructural investment. Developers like BXD thus appear well-placed to obtain further 
concessions from local authorities prior to agreed Long-Stop Dates.
Conclusion
This paper is about how complex long-term contracts address uncertainties inherent to both 
compulsory purchase and property development. The SH and BX Contracts enabled the 
respective developers to manage change in a way that minimised their exposure to the risk of 
financial losses that might accrue from an unprofitable development. But the case studies also 
show how far some local authorities might go in “brokering” property development activity. The 
Contracts stated the baseline specifications for the projects studied here and stipulated the terms 
on which the local authorities would use compulsory purchase for private to private acquisitions. 
Compulsory purchase law thus had a significant impact upon both key contract terms and the 
way that the parties used the Contracts at the respective CPO Inquiries. However, the 
mechanisms contained in the Contracts for redistributio  of the land and the start of building 
work were qualified by a series of conditions precedent to be satisfied before the local authorities 
could require the developers to start building. 
The conditional nature of the Contracts means that the arrangements between the 
respective local authorities and their private development partners look highly “relational”. 
Norms such as flexibility, solidarity and trust appear to have predominated. On closer inspection, 
however, elements of the Contracts were more “discrete” and “presentiated”. Vincent-Jones 
points out that planning is essential in long-term contractual relations (2006, p. 350), but that 
planning must be fair, balanced and adjustable. The parties to the Contracts studied here, 
however, agreed contractual mechanisms that gave the developers tight control over the 
movement from “conditionality” to “unconditionality” and that meant flexibility was entirely on 
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the developers’ terms. SHD and BXD could compel the local authorities to secure confirmation 
for CPOs but could then postpone or withdraw from the projects if prospective profitability 
reduced. Both developers also ensured that the local authorities could only withdraw from the 
projects if the developers had not obtained planning permission and other technical documents, 
if the land assembly efforts failed or if the developers decided not to waive conditions precedent. 
Moreover, the developers ensured that the local authorities could not require the developers to 
start building until the developers were themselves ready to do so. While it is unsurprising that 
private developers bearing the principal financial risk should seek control over the moment at 
which they became obliged to fund land acquisitions and commence construction, this 
preoccupation meant that the pursuit of private profit and investment opportunities 
underpinned the contractual behaviour. The SH and BX Contracts thus linked state 
redistribution of land to a capitalistic market logic. Examination of the Contracts reveals a 
consequent tension between flexibility, contractual solidarity and reciprocity on the one hand 
and, on the other, an asymmetric power imbalance that emerges in and is rearticulated by the 
contractual arrangements. This paper shows that close scrutiny of contractual behaviour is 
essential to understanding the power dynamics operative whenever a local authority agrees to 
redistribute private land for development by a private company.
Notes
1. SHLA/SHD published the SH Contract and other CPO documents on SHLA’s website.
While SHLA has since closed the webpage, the Contract is, as of 5 January 2020,
downloadable in four parts from
https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/a_copy_of_the_contract_between_h. The
author has the Contract and CPO documents on file.
BXLA/BXD published the BX Contract and other CPO documents in a repository managed 
by Persona Associates (http://www.persona-pi.com/). References to the BX Contract in this 
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paper are to document CD/C20 in the repository. Persona Associates has closed the 
repository but the author has the Contract and CPO documents on file.
2. Minutes of and reports considered at SHLA and BXLA meetings are available through the
local authorities’ online repositories.
3. Schedule 4 refers to “overage”, which is the payment by the developer to the local authority
of a share of profit above a pre-agreed level (see also WCC, 2005, paragraph 20).
4. The government has made minor amendments to that guidance (MHCLG, 2019). This paper
considers CPOs made pursuant to both previous guidance (ODPM, 2004) and the later
guidance.
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Table 1: The Unconditional Date, the Long Stop Date and the conditions precedent in 
the SH and BX Contracts
SH Contract BX Contract
Developer can request that local 
authority exercises confirmed CPO 
(clause 10.2)
Developer can request that local 
authority exercises confirmed 
CPO (clause 5.2.3(a))
Developer receives a licence 
allowing access to the land to start 
building (clause 9)
Local authority shall transfer the 
assembled site to the developer 
through a long lease (clause 15.1)
Effect of “the 
Unconditional 
Date”
Either party can terminate if 
construction has not started within 
nine months (clauses 6.3.1 and 
24.1)
Either party can terminate if 
construction has not started within 
12 months (clauses 6.2.1 and 8.3)
Deadline for 
unconditionality 
(“the Long Stop 
Date”)
22 December 2009 (clause 1.1.50) Three years after the CPO is confirmed (clause 1)
Title Condition Funding Condition
Pre-let Condition Pre-let Condition




Road Closure Condition Viability Condition
Planning Condition Planning Condition
Funding Condition Highways Condition
Affordable Housing Condition Infrastructure Condition
Land Assembly Condition Land Assembly Condition
Viability Condition CPO Condition
Conditions 
precedent 
incapable of being 
waived
(SH Contract, Schedule 2) (BX Contract, Schedule 1; MM evidence: paragraphs 5.1-5.9)
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